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We examine the determinants of interest rate margins of Czech banks employing 
bank-level dataset at the quarterly frequency in 2000-2006. Our main results are as 
follows. We find that more efficient banks exhibit lower margins and there is no 
evidence that the banks with lower margins would compensate themselves with 
higher fees. Price stability contributes to lower margins. There are some economies 
of scale, as larger banks tend to charge lower margins. Higher capital adequacy is 
associated with lower margins contributing to the banking stability. Overall, the 
results indicate that the determinants of interest rate margins of Czech banks are 
largely similar to those reported in other studies for developed countries. 
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Czech banks have undergone massive changes since the fall of communism. The banks were 
state-owned at the outset of transition and it took more than a decade until commercial banks 
were privatized. The 1990s were characterized  by  abrupt changes in credit conditions, from 
relatively soft credit conditions in the first half of 1990s to rather tight conditions, credit 
rationing, accumulation of bad loans and bank failures in the second half (Kreuzbergová, 2006). 
Podpiera and Weill (2008) and Podpiera-Pruteanu and Podpiera (2008) claim that deterioration in 
cost efficiency rather than bad luck has been behind the accumulation of bad losses and bank 
failures. Increasingly, the Czech banking industry has been characterized by large foreign 
ownership presence (Haselmann, 2006), greater stability and less government intervention 
(Turnovec, 1999).  
 
Drakos (2003) puts forward that the fall in interest rate margins represents the success of market-
oriented reforms implemented in transition countries. In this paper, we investigate the 
determinants of bank interest rate margins. Among the determinants, we examine both bank-
specific and macroeconomic variables. While the former may have policy implications for bank 
supervision such as how different market structures affect the financial intermediation, the latter 
may convey useful information how macroeconomic policies in general may contribute to the 
stability of banking industry. In consequence, we may compare the results to evidence on other 
Central European countries provided by Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) or to evidence on 
developed countries. 
   2 
In this paper, we examine the interest rate margins of Czech banks in 2000-2006 within the 
dynamic panel data framework. In contrast to majority of empirical applications in this stream of 
literature, we base our results on the quarterly rather than annual data by employing a unique 
Czech National Bank dataset on financial statements of Czech banks. Anticipating our results, we 
find that  more efficient banks exhibit lower interest margins and that banks want to be 
compensated for more risky activities. Price stability positively contributes to lower margins, thus 
enhancing financial intermediation and subsequently fostering economic growth. This finding is 
in line with Boyd et al. (2001), who documents a negative impact of the inflation rate on the 
financial sector performance. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review related literature. Section 3 
contains data description and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 
offers the concluding remarks. Appendix follows. 
 
2 Related Literature  
The pricing policies of banks have been traditionally in the focus of economists. Typically, it has 
been emphasized that bank margins are a result of banking structure, regulatory issues and 
macroeconomic environment. There is immense evidence on the determinants of interest rate 
margins in developed countries (e.g. Ruthenberg and Elias, 1996, Angbazo, 1997, Wong, 1997, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998, Saunders and Schumacher, 2000, Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2004 and others).  
 
Large cross-country evidence on the determinants of interest rate margins is provided by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), who analyze it using weighted least squares in 80 countries 
in 1988-1995 period. Except taking account bank and macroeconomic conditions, they also 
analyze the role of taxation, deposit insurance, financial structure as well as legal and country-
level institutional indicators such as indexes on the rule of law, corruption and contract 
enforcement. Similarly, Gelos (2009) investigates interest rate spreads in 85 countries with a focus 
on Latin America. He finds that higher interest rates, bank efficiency and regulatory requirements 
contribute to higher spreads in Latin America.  
 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) analyze the bank interest rate margins in six European 
countries building on a model developed by Ho and Saunders (1981). They follow a two-step   3 
process. First, controlling for the effects of net interest margins of various imperfections that 
can’ t be built directly into the model (i.e. implicit interest, the opportunity costs of reserves and 
capital requirements) so as to isolate estimates of the pure spread in each country each year. 
Second, they undertake an analysis of determinants of these pure spreads (i.e. market structure, 
interest rate volatility). They find that bank market structure, interest rate volatility and bank 
capitalization matter for the spreads.  
 
Another piece of evidence in provided by Hawtrey and Liang (2008), who investigate bank 
interest rate margins in a set of OECD countries and focus on bank-specific characteristics. They 
find bank market structure, cost efficiency, risk aversion and interest rate volatility among the 
main determinants of margins. Similar set of countries and similar results are presented by 
Valverde and Fernandez (2007).  
 
Regarding the central and eastern Europe, there is much less evidence. Claeys and  Vander 
Vennet (2008) analyze the determinants of bank interest rate margins in central and eastern 
European countries in comparison to Western Europe in 1994-2001 (sample of 2279 banks from 
36 countries). Generally, they examine the role of country-specific bank market characteristics, 
country-specific macroeconomic conditions, bank-specific characteristics and regulatory features 
in influencing the interest rate margins.  
 
One of the hypotheses  Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) raise in their study is whether the 
interest rate margins are driven either by structure conduct performance or efficient structure 
hypothesis. Structure conduct performance postulates a positive relationship between margins 
and market structure reflecting non-competitive pricing behavior in concentrated markets. An 
attendant theory is a relative-market-power hypothesis, i.e. only banks with large market shares 
are able to exercise market power in pricing and consequently earn higher margins. On the other 
hand, efficient structure hypothesis states that differences in interest margins are attributable to 
differences in operational efficiency across banks. There are two versions of this hypothesis. X-
efficiency version points out that bank with superior management or production technologies 
have lower costs and subsequently can offer more competitive interest rates on loans and/or 
deposits, leading to a negative relationship between operational efficiency and interest margins. 
Since these firms are also assumed to gain larger market shares, the market may become more 
concentrated as a result of competition. Hence the correlation between market structure and 
margins is spurious (runs via higher efficiency). One way to deal with this is to include market   4 
concentration, market share and operational efficiency simultaneously into the regression. 
Second, scale-efficiency version emphasizes that some firms simply produce at a more efficient 
scale resulting under competition to smaller margins. Again, these firms assumed to increase 
market share leading to higher market concentration. 
 
3 Data and Econometric Approach 
The data available to us cover financial statements of 25 banks (nearly all Czech banks) at the 
quarterly frequency from 2000:1 to 2006:1 and the source of the data is Czech National internal 
dataset of financial statements on commercial banks and building societies. Given that data for 2 
banks in the sample are not available for all periods renders the panel unbalanced. The number of 
observations is 562. 
 
In general, our empirical model follows the literature (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008, Valverde 
and Fernandez, 2007).  
 
NIM = δ·NIM(-1) + β1·FEES + β2·CAD(-4) + β3·LOANS + β4·ADMIN + β5·SIZE + β6·HERF 
+ β7·INFL + β8·GDP + Σ αt·(time dummy) + η i + υ it 
 
for i = 1, …  , N and t = 1, …  , T 
 
where variables are described in Table 1. As a result, we include bank-specific variables to tackle 
with inherent bank heterogeneity, market structure and macroeconomic conditions as potential 
determinants of interest rate margins. ηi ~ IID(0, σ η
2) and υ it ~ IID(0, σ υ
2) are independent of 
each other and among themselves, ηi being individual effects. As stated above, we have N = T = 
25. Descriptive statistics of our variables are presented in Table 2 in the Appendix.  
 
Table 1:  Description of variables 
Notation:  Variable description: 
NIM  net interest margin, i.e. net interest income/assets 
FEES  fees income/assets 
CAD  capital adequacy 
LOANS  total loans/assets 
ADMIN  administrative costs/assets 
SIZE  assets/median assets in the banking sector 
HERF  Herfindahl index (higher number implies less competitive environment) 
INFL  current inflation rate  
GDP  real GDP growth   5 
 
As the model is primarily empirical, we also tested other determinants such as the level of interest 
rate, stock market capitalization, corporate income tax and government ownership dummy, but 
failed to find them significant. These results are available upon request. 
 
CAD(-4), i.e. capital adequacy lagged by 4 quarters, is chosen with regard to the consideration 
that riskiness of a banking portfolio as assessed at a given point in time is reflected in interest 
income only with a certain lag.
1 
 
Before estimation of our empirical model, we tested each series for stationarity based on panel 
data unit root tests developed by Maddala-Wu (1999). This test of panel stationarity was used at 
varying lag lengths using both ADF and Phillips-Peron statistics.
2 Overall, evidence for 
stationarity of our panel has been found. These results are available upon request.  
 
To deal with endogeneity and dynamic nature of interest margin determination, we opt for the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. This seems to be a suitable dynamic panel estimator for us, 
as we find that the persistence of lagged dependant variable is not high. 
 
4 Results 
We report the results on interest margin determination in Table 3 and 4. Various specifications of 
equation (1) are reported. The specifications differ based on whether we include the full set of 
explanatory variables, time dummies and whether one-step or two-step Arrelano-Bond estimator 
has been carried out. 
 
TABLE 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Subject to various sensitivity tests, the results suggest that less efficient banks, as proxied by the 
administrative costs, exhibit greater interest margins. This is beneficial for customers, as it the 
finding implies –  in line with theory –  that more efficient banks pass lower costs on to their 
clients in the form higher deposit or lower lending rates (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008). 
Higher capital adequacy of a bank is associated with lower interest margins. This contrasts with 
the Ho and Saunders (1981) dealership model that predicts positive relationship, as net interest 
                                                 
1 Presumably more than for other banking variables in the model. 
2 Unlike some other tests, the Maddala-Wu (1999) test doesn’ t require a balanced panel.   6 
rate margins should increase the capital base as the exposure to risk increases. Our finding is 
rather in line with the hypothesis raised by Brock and Franken (2003), who put forward that less 
capitalized banks have the motivation to accept more risk (associated with higher spread) in order 
to receive higher returns. Analogously, more capitalized banks invest more cautiously, as there is 
more capital at risk (Brock and Franken, 2003).  
 
Interest margins are higher for banks with a higher loans-to-assets ratio. This indicates that banks 
providing credit for riskier projects require higher margins as compensation. Income from fees 
and charges does not seem to  have explanatory power and we have not discovered any 
substitution relationship in which lower interest margins would be compensated by higher fees 
income and vice versa. Larger banks seem to set lower margins, which is suggestive of economies 
of scale. This contrasts with evidence on new EU member states, where no systematic 
relationship is found (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008).  
 
Our measure of competition, Herfindahl index, is never significant and thus, we do not find 
evidence that market power matters for interest margin. Albeit, the insignificance of index may 
reflect multicollinearity with some other explanatory variables, even simple scatter plot do not 
indicate any pattern. We also used concentration ratio for 3 largest banks instead of HERF, but 
also failed to find any significant relationship.  
 
Next, macroeconomic conditions seem to affect the margins, too. While GDP growth is not 
significant (which may reflect 7 years time dimension of our sample that may not be sufficient to 
capture the business cycle fully), banks seem to be setting higher margins in a higher-inflation 
environment.  Thus, central banks aiming to achieve price stability also contribute to better 
financial intermediation (Boyd et al., 2001), which is crucial for economic development (Levine, 
2005) especially in less financially developed countries (Coricelli and Roland, 2008). Overall, the 
results indicate that the determinants of interest rate margins of Czech banks are similar, to a 
large extent, to those reported in other studies for developed countries. 
 
We also estimated our empirical model by different econometric techniques such as random or 
fixed effects panel estimator. While this approach is prone to endogeneity, these results largely 
support our aforementioned findings and are available upon request.   7 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we investigate the determinants of interest rate margins of Czech banks based on 
quarterly data in 2000-2006 using Arrelano-Bond dynamic panel data estimator. We find that that 
more efficient banks exhibit lower margins and there is no evidence that the banks with lower 
margins would compensate themselves with higher fees. The results advocate the hypothesis that 
more efficient banking systems  are supportive for financial intermediation and a llocation of 
funds. 
 
Price stability contributes to lower margins and thus, enhances financial intermediation, too, and, 
subsequently fosters economic development (Levine, 2005). This finding can thus be interpreted 
as additional evidence in support of price stability oriented central banking. The results indicate 
some economies of scale, as larger banks tend to charge lower margins. Higher capital adequacy 
of a bank is associated with lower interest margins. Our finding is rather in line with the 
hypothesis raised by Brock and Franken (2003), who put forward that less capitalized banks have 
the motivation to accept more risk (associated with higher spread) in order to receive higher 
returns.  
 
In terms of future research, we believe that it would be worthwhile to build carefully calibrated 
structural models that would be useful for financial markets stress testing and, more generally, for  
policy advice in the authorities such as the central banks dealing with financial stability.  
 
 
   8 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2:  Summary statistics
3 
Variable:  Mean:  Std. dev.:  Variable:  Mean:  Std. dev.: 
NIM  0.00506  0.00341  ADMIN  0.00499  0.00349 
FEES  0.00204  0.00223  SIZE  3.21615  5.53045 
CAD  28.1953  38.3449  HERF  0.14991  0.01397 
LOANS  0.71429  0.19216  INFL  2.54533  1.59944 
GDP  3.73536  1.63834  ---  ----  --- 
 
                                                 
3 These are unweighted statistics, hence e.g. mean CAD high due to some small banks with a secure portfolio 
and high capital adequacy.   11
Table 3: Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel GMM estimation of interest margin determinants 
 
  Specification 1:  Specification 2*:  Specification 3:  Specification 4*:  Specification 5: 
Variable:  coeff.  std. err.  p  coeff.  std. err.  p  coeff.  std. err.  p  coeff.  std. err.  p  coeff.  std. err.  p 
NIM(-1)  -0.144  0.170  39.7  -0.144  0.170  39.5  -0.145  0.175  40.8  -0.145  0.175  40.6  -0.140  0.167  40.1 
FEES  0.142  0.101  16.1  0.137  0.089  12.4  0.121  0.106  25.1  0.116  0.094  21.7       
CAD  -7.0x10-6  5.1x10-6  16.9  -7.0x10-6  5.1x10-6  17.1  -7.3x10-6  5.0x10-6  14.5  -7.3x10-6  5.0x10-6  14.9  -8.6x10-6  5.7x10-6  13.3 
LOANS  8.8x10-3  2.4x10-3  0.0  8.9x10-3  2.3x10-3  0.0  9.0x10-3  2.3x10-3  0.0  9.1x10-3  2.3x10-3  0.0  8.8x10-3  2.3x10-3  0.0 
ADMIN  0.366  0.096  0.0  0.371  0.096  0.0  0.334  0.111  0.2  0.339  0.111  0.2  0.424  0.088  0.0 
SIZE  -1.5x10-4  7.6x10-5  4.5  -1.5x10-4  7.5x10-5  4.6  -1.5x10-4  7.5x10-5  4.3  -1.5x10-4  7.4x10-5  4.5  -1.5x10-4  7.5x10-5  4.4 
HERF  dropped due to collinearity  dropped due to collinearity  0.014  0.008  8.5  0.014  0.008  8.5  dropped due to collinearity 
INFL  2.1x10-4  9.5x10-5  3.0  2.1x10-4  9.5x10-5  2.9  9.0x10-5  5.8x10-5  11.8  9.1x10-5  5.8x10-5  11.4  1.9x10-4  1.1x10-4  8.5 
GDP  4.9x10-5  1.5 x10-4  74.8  4.8x10-5  1.5 x10-4  75.4  1.2x10-4  9.6x10-5  20.3  1.2x10-4  9.6x10-5  20.4       
time dum.  yes      yes      no      no      yes     
  df  χ 2(df)    df  χ 2(df)    df  χ 2(df)    df  χ 2(df)    df  χ 2(df)   
Wald test  25  7.5x108  R  25  1.8x109  R  9  91.44  R  9  83.10  R  24  12504.1  R 
Sargan test  1765  0.22  NR  1742  0.22  NR  2063  17.38  NR  2040  17.40  NR  1467  1.20  NR 
  z  p    z  p    z  p    z  p    z  p   
AR(1) test  -2.21  2.7  R  -2.21  2.7  R  -2.13  3.3  R  -2.13  3.3  R  -2.23  2.6  R 
AR(2) test  0.94  34.6  NR  0.97  33.4  NR  1.05  29.4  NR  1.08  28.0  NR  0.98  32.7  NR 
Dependent variable: NIM 
One-step results with robust standard errors reported, p = p-value (in %). 
time dum. = time dummies, not reported if included; df = degrees of freedom 
R = rejected at 5 % significance level; NR = not rejected at 5 % significance level 
INFL, GDP and time dummies specified as exogenous; CAD, LOANS, ADMIN, SIZE, HERF as predetermined; 
* = FEES specified as endogenous in (2) and (4), while the variable is specified as predetermined in (1) and (3) 
AR(j) test = Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order j equal to zero 








   12
Table 4: Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel GMM estimation of interest margin determinants  
  Specification 1:  Specification 2*:  Specification 3:  Specification 4*:  Specification 5: 
Variable:  coeff.  std. err.  p  coeff.  std. err.  p  coeff.  std. err.  p  coeff.  std. err.  p  coeff.  std. err.  p 
NIM(-1)  -0.138  0.170  41.6  -0.137  0.170  42.3  -0.138  0.175  42.9  -0.137  0.175  43.6  -0.135  0.166  41.5 
FEES  0.142  0.100  15.3  0.141  0.093  12.9  0.125  0.104  22.9  0.123  0.096  20.0       
CAD(-4)  -9.4x10-6  4.8x10-6  5.1  -9.5x10-6  4.9x10-6  5.3  -8.2x10-6  4.9x10-6  9.6  -8.3x10-6  5.0x10-6  9.9  -1.0x10-5  5.6x10-6  6.4 
LOANS  8.9x10-3  2.3x10-3  0.0  8.8x10-3  2.3x10-3  0.0  9.0x10-3  2.3x10-3  0.0  8.9x10-3  2.2x10-3  0.0  8.9x10-3  2.3x10-3  0.0 
ADMIN  0.370  0.091  0.0  0.374  0.090  0.0  0.334  0.106  0.2  0.338  0.105  0.1  0.432  0.081  0.0 
SIZE  -1.6x10-4  7.4x10-5  3.0  -1.5x10-4  7.3x10-5  3.4  -1.6x10-4  7.3x10-5  3.2  -1.5x10-4  7.2x10-5  3.6  -1.6x10-4  7.4x10-5  3.2 
HERF  dropped due to collinearity  dropped due to collinearity  0.013  0.009  14.4  0.013  0.009  14.1  dropped due to collinearity 
INFL  2.1x10-4  9.1x10-5  2.3  2.1x10-4  9.1x10-5  2.3  1.0x10-4  5.8x10-5  7.8  1.0x10-4  5.8x10-5  7.8  2.0x10-4  1.1x10-4  6.0 
GDP  2.5x10-5  1.5 x10-4  87.0  2.4x10-5  1.5 x10-4  87.1  1.1x10-4  9.7x10-5  27.0  1.1x10-4  9.7x10-5  27.0       
time dum.  yes      yes      no      no      yes     
  df  χ 2(df)    df  χ 2(df)    df  χ 2(df)    df  χ 2(df)    df  χ 2(df)   
Wald test  26  5.4x109  R  26  1.8x1010  R  9  82.53  R  9  78.65  R  24  3857.7  R 
Sargan test  1765  0.06  NR  1742  0.06  NR  2063  18.87  NR  2040  19.01  NR  1467  3.82  NR 
  z  p    z  p    z  p    z  p    z  p   
AR(1) test  -2.17  3.0  R  -2.17  3.0  R  -2.09  3.6  R  -2.10  3.6  R  -2.19  2.9  R 
AR(2) test  1.10  27.0  NR  1.14  25.3  NR  1.24  21.6  NR  1.29  19.9  NR  1.12  26.4  NR 
Dependent variable: NIM 
Two-step results with robust standard errors reported, p = p-value (in %). 
time dum. = time dummies, not reported if included; df = degrees of freedom 
R = rejected at 5 % significance level; NR = not rejected at 5 % significance level 
INFL, GDP and time dummies specified as exogenous; CAD, LOANS, ADMIN, SIZE, HERF as predetermined; 
* = FEES specified as endogenous in (2) and (4), while the variable is specified as predetermined in (1) and (3) 
AR(j) test = Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order j equal to zero 
Sargan test = test of overidentifying restrictions based on two-step Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimates 
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